“Systemic Dynamic Social Theory.” Hull, D.L., Sociological Quarterly (1970), Vol. 11, Issue 3, pp. 351-363.
The Article
In the literature on systems theory, the work of Ludvig von Bertalanffy’s and his General Systems Theory (GST) is generally held as foundational to the area of study for generalists. Hull (1970) introduces the article with a discussion of the high esteem for Bertalanffy's work, believing that work in systems theory today has lost sight of the original thought and arguing that the deviation of “general systems theory in contrast to General Systems Theory” is a dangerous development. The author thus provides critique of the work of sociologist Hugo Engelmann and the theorist's dynamic social theory to iterate his argument. In doing so, the author pinpoints the problems with the misinterpretation of Bertalanffy’s work from the evolution of the classical assumptions of science, any theory “concerned in large measure with the problems surrounding the verification and falsification of hypotheses embedded in a highly articulated theory” (Hull 1970, p. 352). Hull (1970) details the influence of the changing assumptions science from Newtonian to modern science in Engelmann’s work, particularly the challenges to the structure of classical logic (p. 353). The author then critiques Engleman’s reconstruction of logic and the belief that a calculus could be devised to formulate a social theory and dynamics analogous to particle physics, which the sociologist entitled “Systemic Dynamic Social Theory.”
The article provides a summary analysis of the dynamic social theory as it breaks social interactions down into elementary particles of organization. Engelmann believes a behavioral science from biological and physical systems could be effectively explain behavior through “(1) an analysis of the behavioral units into biological processes within which they emerge, or (2) derivation of various theorems from the postulates and the identification of these theorems with common-sense phenomena” (p. 357). This general thesis of the sociologists' work is the target of the article’s critique, as “Engelmann is not interested in such psychological matters but only in the logical schematizations of science” (Hull 1970, p. 353). Hull (1970) breaks down the logic of Engelmann’s thesis for “Systemic Dynamic Social Theory” and its identification with general systems theory. In conclusion, the article then asserts that the systemic dynamic social theory and the intersections with the behavioral sciences are superficial. Moreover, the author maintains that if a genuine systemic dynamic social theory were possible for application to general systems science that such a literal interpretation of the theory would be detrimental to general systems theory itself.
Reflection
The article brings up very valid points about the misinterpretation of general systems theory (rather, General Systems Theory). Such misinterpretations have a history in the behavioral sciences and are a major focus of Debora Hammond’s book The Science of Synthesis: Exploring the Social Implications of General Systems Theory. In fact, it seems to me that the author's major argument is better understood through Hammond's historical research on the origins of systems theory and how Bertalanffy's work became puzzled by behaviorism following the world wars. The approach by Hull (1970) to make a technical argument against the logic of the theory accomplishes as little as the logic itself. While not familiar with the work of Engelmann, Hilary Putnam's work in logic and quantum logic could actually justify Engelmann's work, at least the idea of the justification of a logical system with "empirical identification from physics" (Hull 1970, p. 360). The question remains if such a system of pure mathematics could provide method to effectively explain behavior and social dynamics. These complicated questions involve lengthy explanation with so many uncertainties over whether methods in the physical sciences could be applied to the social sciences, it seems to me that the author is correct in his critique. However, I believe critique need focus not on the science, but the misinterpetation and misuse of science.
Really, Engelmann reminds me of the main character in A Beautiful Mind chasing around pigeons in the park trying to determine an algorithm to explain their behavior. The concerns of the article are with the possibility for such an explanation of human behavior and the misuse of that science. Rather, the misinformed belief that such a behavioral social theory is possible with any attempt to justify the knowledge of authority, which today – at the present state of science – is really quite far from reality. My own belief is that when and if it becomes an actuality, it will affirm pluralism and Bertalanffy's definition of the historical, cultural and biological relativity of knowledge. Today, we are left to accept a pragmatism to positivism – in fact, as defined by Putnam himself – which, in the case of the article is found in Hammond’s research and by uncovering Bertalanffy's original systems theory. For those curious in doing so, evidently without much of a life, like myself, take interest in Bertalanffy's "An outline of General Systems Theory," which appropriately appears in the same issue of The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science as Karl Popper's "Indeterminism in Quantum Physics and in Classical Physics," Vol. 1, No. 2, August 1950.
What interested me in the article is that it suggests both the promise of Bertalanffy’s thought (though it has had little impact and influence), the consequences and potential dangers of misinterpretating science, particularly as it relates to systems theory and Hammond’s work. There is also a subtle art to the article in the analysis of social dynamics. The romanticism to the idea of a unified science through the physical sciences has enchanted humanity since the dawn of time. The article offers a glimpse of such an idea in correlation with social theory and systems science like no other discussion of the topic I've read, which intrigued me. However, there is no possibility of it justifying a singular, authoritative view of the world and no possibility for such a social theory. The problem at present is the belief that it could, not the quest in search for this Holy Grail of science.